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and make recommendations for a more focused and tailored strategy to respond to this modern day hydra.
The Hydra's Religious Ideology
To glimpse the soul of Al Qaeda, one needs a basic understanding of how the organization sees itself fitting into the larger scheme of Islam. They "…perceive themselves as the base for a Salafi-led Islamic revival and as the vanguard of the global 1. This is a clash of civilizations. Violent "jihad" is not a matter of choice: it is an individual duty before God.
2. There now exist only two camps -good and evil. There can be no middle ground, no standing on the sidelines in this epochal conflict.
3. Violence by Muslims in the defense of Islam is the only solution.
4. Al-Qa'ida and other like minded Muslims are a divinely inspired and guided vanguard to lead other Muslims in this war. By fulfilling God's will, their struggle is fated to succeed.
The United
States is the engine of the war against Islam; therefore, attacking the United States must be a priority.
6. US power is based on its economy. Therefore, large scale, spectacular attacks -especially focused on (US) economic targetsare desirable.
Violent jihad must continue until Sharia law is implemented throughout
all Muslim lands and the Caliphate is reestablished.
Many theological and legal restrictions on the use of violence by
Muslims do not apply to this war.
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The Heads of the Hydra -Strategy
These religious beliefs form the foundation for Al Qaeda's strategic thinking. Like its ideology, Al Qaeda's strategic thinking is extracted and deduced from the public statements, internal communications and websites used by its leaders. As one might expect, there are varying differences of opinion in the group. However, two main strategic themes emerge from the literature: the strategy of violent jihad and the strategy of uniting the ummah. 6 Violent jihad has two objectives. The first objective is to remove US and Jewish presence from Muslim lands. The second is to overthrow local apostate regimes. The objective of uniting the ummah is to provide the manpower and support necessary to sustain violent jihad. Most Al Quaeda strategists consider both violent jihad and uniting the ummah necessary for achieving the ultimate goal of reestablishing the caliphate. Al Qaeda is pursuing a two pronged strategy: a military campaign (battle of arms) and an information operations campaign (battle of ideas).
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The military campaign is directed primarily at the US by focusing on business interests and military targets. Al Qaeda's intent is to use the fear it generates from terrorism to bait Western military forces into the Middle East and thereby bleed Western economies dry by forcing them to defend everywhere against the threat of future terrorism. 8 The Hydra's Heads -Netwar There are some significant differences between the two insurgencies. First, unlike Iraq, it appears that the Taliban and Al Qaeda groups are going to great lengths to avoid civilian and non-combatant Afghan casualties. Second, the insurgency in Afghanistan is rural-based with a favorable geography. Third, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan has no history of a strong central government with established bureaucracies for delivery of public services. Lastly, the insurgents in Afghanistan have a safe haven in
Pakistan into which they can retreat and regroup. These differences make defeating the Afghanistan insurgency significantly more problematic than the insurgency in Iraq.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has demonstrated a willingness to engage in classic guerilla strategy as a means to achieve its strategic designs. The U.S. invasion of Iraq presented Al Qaeda an unanticipated opportunity that it seized and attempted to exploit using an urban-based insurgency strategy. In Afghanistan, a Countering the Hydra's Heads -Netwar
Although netwar enables Al Qaeda to have a far greater reach and impact than its numbers warrant, it comes with vulnerabilities. The key is to understand these vulnerabilities and exploit them. "What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy." 46 The war on Al Qaeda is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas.
Most senior policy makers in the U.S. believe that winning the battle of ideas is vital to success and one that the US cannot afford to lose. 47 To win the battle of ideas, one should heed the wisdom of Sun Tzu and understand how the enemy thinks about its information operations and the role that it plays in its overall strategy. With this understanding of the enemy comes the ability to effectively attack Al Qaeda's strategy. As noted earlier, Al Qaeda primarily uses the tools of the information revolution to wage its war of ideas. It is dependent on the internet for recruitment and is becoming more dependent on it for training as the U.S.
continues to interdict its training camps in the uncontrolled areas of the world. For Al Qaeda, winning the battle of ideas is a precondition for success. The primary aim of the How well is the U.S. fighting the battle of ideas? The general consensus is that it is not doing well. But, the U.S. is doing better than its senior leaders believe. The perception of Al Qaeda's strategic thinkers is that their enemies possess capabilities beyond their ability to match. They worry that they cannot win the battle of ideas that is vital to their strategy. This is positive for the U.S. It is crucial that the U.S. continue to press this advantage and tweak the strategy to hasten the defeat of Al Qaeda.
war of ideas is to unite the ummah and provide the manpower necessary to sustain violent jihad. Al Qaeda's view centers on the concept of dawah (the call). 48 Dawah is their information operations. Al Qaeda uses it to persuade and indoctrinate Muslims to accept its world view and to promote violent jihad as an individual responsibility of true Muslims. 49 How effective is its information operations? Effective enough to keep the movement alive, but it has come up far short of anticipated results. One prominent Al Qaeda strategist, Abu Naji, estimated that 500,000 mujahideen would be necessary "for our long battle and to achieve the results we want." 50 This number is less than 1percent of the 1.2 billion Muslims worldwide. Although no one knows how many recruits have responded to Al Qaeda's call, estimates range from a few thousand to twenty thousand recruits-well below the required figure. The failure of Muslims to respond to the call has been a big disappointment and setback for Al Qaeda's strategic thinkers. Al
Qaeda's inability to recruit even a fraction of the required 500,000 points to the limited nature of its appeal in the Muslim world 51 The question then becomes how to attack this vulnerability? In Al Qaida's view, the following pose the greatest threats to their dawah: the power of the media allied with the United States (even Al-Jazirah is seen as a threat); opposition of moderate senior Islamic scholars; an ummah corrupted by western influence and distracted by "worldly concerns"; and internal policy differences (the use of violence against other Muslims; appealing to Muslims by means other than violent jihad; agreeing on a strategic focus).
and to a potential critical vulnerability of the movement.
ways. Potentially, the most effective means is to promote the expansion of media outlets throughout the Middle East and provide support to moderate Islamic scholars. [The]Islamic principle of tawhid, or the principle of the absolute unity of God, and an identification of Islam as an all-encompassing religious, political, and social system. According to this perspective, Islamic faith, adherence to Islamic law, and implementation of conservative Islamic social and political principles are synonymous. 56 The late al-Qaeda ideologue Yusuf al-Ayiri wrote,
One of the worst products of secularism is democracy, which abolishes the authority of shari'a over society and opposes it in form and content. The Most High said 'the command is for none but Allah.' Democracy says that the command is for none but the majority of the people.
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Ayman al-Zawahiri likened democracy to an idolatrized religion.
Democracy is a new religion. In Islam, legislation comes from God; in a democracy, this capacity is given to the people. Therefore, this a new religion, based on making the people into gods and giving them God's rights and attributes. This is tantamount to associating idols with God and falling into unbelief, since God said: 'The command is for none but God. He has commanded that you worship none but him. 58 In the war of ideas, perception is reality. Actions must shape the desired perception.
An effective method for the U.S. to fight this battle of ideas and promote its interests is to first craft the message and understand the audience and then follow with actions that support the message. The U.S. should gauge the response and adjust as required.
By far the greatest liability of Al Qaeda's dependence on the internet and other forms of global communications is that their thinking, strategy, and tactics are readily available to its adversaries. In other words, Al Qaeda's playbook and game plans are accessible for the U.S. to exploit. The question is whether the government can respond fast enough and in a comprehensive way to effectively thwart Al Qaeda's plans.
Hierarchical organizations like U.S. government bureaucracies can impede coordination, information sharing and timely decision making. All these functions are critical for effectively countering the threat. Although an analysis of U.S. government intelligence, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency organizations is beyond the scope of this paper, efforts to flatten and fully integrate the many government organizations involved should be considered in order to reduce response time and increase effectiveness.
Al Qaeda's increasing dependence on the internet as its main source for recruitment provides another weakness that the U.S. can exploit. Although the social networking sites used by Al Qaeda recruiters are difficult to monitor (privacy and constitutional considerations limit the ability of the government to monitor these sites),
there are other ways to disrupt Al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. The anonymity offered by internet sites makes counterterrorism sting operations attractive for identifying recruiters and potentially infiltrating their cells and networks. To be successful, it is not necessary to infiltrate the networks or even identify the recruiters. Of course, either result is ideal, but simply ensuring that they are aware that the government is conducting these types of operations may be sufficient to thwart a large portion of Al Qaeda's recruiting effort. This strategy complicates and slows down the process while Al Qaeda recruiters and leaders execute ever more laborious screening measures to determine whether potential recruits are legitimate and can be trusted. Even after recruits have made it through the screening process, suspicions and mistrust are likely to remain until recruits can prove themselves. These tactics provide time for intelligence and counterterrorism agencies to identify, locate, and interdict potential recruits. Although this cat and mouse game is uncomfortable, it may be the most effective means available given U.S. legal and constitutional considerations. The case of the five American Muslim men from Virginia illustrates the effectiveness of this tactic.
Although, they were able to make their way to Pakistan, they ultimately did not link up with Al Qaeda operatives because those operatives were concerned that the men were CIA proxies attempting to infiltrate the group. appears that the organization has recovered its balance and evolved, making it harder to defeat. Now the organization is more dispersed and less reliant on key leaders for its operations. Killing bin Laden or al Zawahiri today would deal a significant blow to Al
Qaeda, but it is unlikely to lead to the defeat of the organization.
It is likely that it will continue its efforts to over-extend the U.S. and bleed its economy. Unfortunately, the U.S. Government's over-reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attack has played into the hands of Al Qaeda by drawing in U.S. forces where they can By their very nature, insurgencies are drawn out, lengthy struggles fought in both the military and political domains. Likewise, counterinsurgencies require time to successfully prosecute. Post World War II insurgencies have lasted on average almost 13 years with some lasting decades. 65 Combating insurgencies can take 8 to 10 years of sustained effort. 66 The U.S. has expended significant blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan. ). Arquilla and Ronfeldt believe the information revolution is changing the nature of conflict by enabling non-state actors to wage effective conflict through networks. Arquilla and Ronfeldt depict Netwar as being used by terrorists, criminals and social activists. They assert that the information revolution favors network forms of organization over hierarchical forms and that the conduct and outcome of conflicts increasingly depend on information and communications.
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